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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the over-the-counter 
customer order execution practices of several large stock 
brokers constituted securities fraud. The district court 
concluded that these practices were not fraudulent and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We 
will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts of this case are set forth thoroughly in the 
district court's opinion, In re Merrill Lynch Securities Litig., 
911 F. Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1995). Succinctly stated, plaintiffs 
are investors who purchase and sell so-called "over the 
counter" securities which are traded on a computerized 
price quotation system known as NASDAQ. They claim that 
the peculiarities of this market have given securities dealers 
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an opportunity--upon which they have capitalized--to 
inflate their profit margins at the expense of customers, 
resulting in inferior execution prices vis-a-vis other dealers 
who have access to superior, privately quoted prices. These 
practices, plaintiffs allege, violated the defendants' duty of 
best execution, but were never disclosed by the dealers, 
thus amounting to a securities fraud under section 10 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) and 
Rule 10-b5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 
The NASDAQ, which is now the second-largest securities 
market in the United States, is different from the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges, because it is a dealer- 
created, rather than an auction, market. In an auction 
market, buy and sell orders actually "meet" on the 
exchange floor, with prices being set by the continuous 
interaction of those orders, under the supervision of market 
"specialists." This type of market has traditionally been 
used for widely traded securities. 
 
Dealer markets, on the other hand, rely on "market 
makers" to set prices and maintain the liquidity of 
securities. This system arose out of literal, over-the-counter 
trading of stocks that were not as widely traded as those 
listed on the NYSE or AMEX. In a dealer market, each 
market maker decides the prices at which it will buy and 
sell a security; the difference between the listed "ask" and 
"bid" prices is known as the "spread," from which the 
market maker is compensated for its efforts and risk. 
 
Under that system, of course, as long as timely, accurate 
information is available regarding each market maker's 
prices, orders will naturally gravitate towards the dealer 
with the most favorable prices, and this will establish a 
single, albeit two-price, market for each security traded. 
NASDAQ (which stands for National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) is the information 
system that relays market makers' pricing information to 
buyers and sellers. NASDAQ quotes the National Best Bid 
and Offer--known in the industry as the "NBBO"--price for 
every stock on the system. 
 
Because of recently created sources of additional, non- 
public pricing information, however, the NBBO may no 
 
                                4 
longer always be counted upon to display the "best" price. 
Systems such as SelectNet and Instinet, which are not 
available to all investors or even to all dealers, may be 
quoting a more favorable price than the NBBO at any given 
moment. Appellants allege that, not only were better prices 
displayed in many instances, but that the defendant 
dealers knew such prices were available, yet continued to 
book their orders at the inferior, NBBO price at the same 
time that they were trading at the more favorable price for 
their own accounts. 
 
In addition, in many instances dealers are able to obtain 
more favorable prices by "crossing" the customer's order 
with the order of another customer. For example, assume 
that a dealer quotes an "ask" price of $32 1/4 and an "bid" 
price of $32 for shares of XYZ Corporation. A customer 
places an order to purchase 100 shares, but, unbeknownst 
to him, the dealer has an outstanding limit order from 
another customer to sell at 32 1/8. That dealer could 
simply cross the two orders and execute the trade at 32 
1/8, saving the customer $12.50. The dealer would not 
incur any market risk on such a transaction. Appellants 
allege that it is a fraud for the defendant dealers to 
continue to execute trades at the NBBO price, 
appropriating the full "spread" as a fee for their services. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment to 
defendants, for two principal reasons. First, it held that 
defendants made no actionable misrepresentations, 
because the duty of best execution is ill-defined and there 
is no widely accepted view that execution of trades at the 
NBBO price fails to satisfy that duty; thus, it would be 
improper to find that defendants omitted or concealed 
material facts. 911 F. Supp. at 771. Second, the court held 
that, even if defendants omitted information, they could 
not, as a matter of law, have acted with the requisite 
scienter. Id. at 772. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
To make out a securities fraud claim under § 10 of the 
Securities Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must 
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show: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) 
scienter on the part of the defendant; (3) reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and (4) damage resulting from the 
misrepresentation. Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 
F.2d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 1991). Although the district court 
held that there was no misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact, we will assume, without deciding, that the 
trading practices here constituted an otherwise actionable 
misrepresentation, because we conclude that the district 
court correctly decided that scienter was lacking as a 
matter of law, and appellants' securities law claims fail on 
that basis alone. 
 
The element of scienter has been defined as "a mental 
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 96 S. 
Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976). Scienter can also be 
established by a showing of recklessness, which is defined 
as "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 
care, . . . which presents a danger of misleading . . . that 
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
actor must have been aware of it." Healey v. Catalyst 
Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting 
Sundstrand v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 
(7th Cir. 1977)). The recklessness standard comprehends 
actions very close to intentional conduct; mere indifference 
to the consequences of a statement is not sufficient. 
Healey, 616 F.2d at 649. 
 
Appellants assert, nevertheless, that the record before the 
district court contained sufficient evidence from which a 
rational factfinder could infer scienter. The district court 
disagreed, opining that because the duty of best execution 
is not "established," but ambiguous, the failure to disclose 
that all orders were being executed at the NBBO price could 
not, as a matter of law, have involved scienter. We agree. 
 
Appellants attempt to refute the district court's reasoning 
by arguing that "the absence of a regulation prohibiting a 
specific practice does not mean such practice cannot be 
considered fraudulent." Specifically, they rely on our 
decision in Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
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Inc., 835 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1987), which they assert is 
"directly on point." We are not persuaded. 
 
It is true that Ettinger involved a securities firm that 
failed to disclose excessive markups, but there the 
similarity to this case ends. The dealer in Ettinger argued 
that its compliance with Rule 10b-10 insulated it from a 
material misrepresentation attack under Rule 10b-5, and 
we held simply that such compliance did not preclude a 
10b-5 action. Id. at 1036. Moreover, Ettinger involved a 
markup practice that both the SEC and the courts had 
already condemned--the duty in that instance, unlike here, 
was clear. See id. at 1033. And finally, scienter was not 
even an issue in Ettinger. It had been waived in the district 
court. Id. at 1036 n.7. Ettinger is inapposite. 
 
Appellants also cite several cases which allegedly stand 
for the proposition that violations of § 10(b) can occur when 
a broker-dealer fails to execute customer orders at the best 
possible price. Two of those cases, however, involved 
execution practices that no reasonable dealer could have 
possibly believed proper. See Barnett v. United States, 319 
F.2d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1963) (excessive mark-ups of 
between 25 and 67% not disclosed; customer order never 
executed at advertised price, while dealer was trading same 
security for its own account at superior price); Opper v. 
Hancock Securities Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 673 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (dealer claimed to be 
searching unsuccessfully for buyer to purchase customer's 
stock, while at the same time trading in that same stock 
profitably for its own account). Three other cases interpose 
a third-party dealer in the transaction, thus increasing the 
customer's expense; this practice had already been 
condemned by long-standing judicial and regulatory 
authority. See Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 
1971); In re Delaware Management Co., 43 SEC 392, 399- 
400 (1967); In re Hoit Rose & Co., 1969 SEC LEXIS 244 
(1969).1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Indeed, the only authority appellants are able to cite with facts similar 
to the present case is an unpublished district court opinion in 
typescript, Lesko v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. C78- 
1740 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 1979), in which the court opined, with very 
little analysis, that a deliberate policy of sending all orders to the AMEX 
rather than "seeking the best price in the available markets" stated a 
claim for securities fraud. That court did not discuss scienter, and is 
thus inapposite, whatever its relative persuasiveness. 
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As the district court recognized, the most instructive case 
on the issue of scienter is Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 
F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1991). There, a broker failed to disclose its 
production credits, spreads or markups, while at the same 
time it was profiting from customer transactions against its 
own inventory. The district court found, after trial, that 
defendants had acted with scienter, but the court of 
appeals reversed because there was no established 
regulatory duty to disclose and intent to deceive could not 
thus be established by omission. Here, as in Platsis, the 
dealers were under no established duty to execute trades at 
other than the NBBO price or to disclose their execution 
practices. Indeed, it appears that the industry as a whole 
used the NBBO to satisfy the duty of best execution. Under 
the reasoning of Platsis, then, which we adopt, there was 
no scienter. Accord Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1987) (failure to disclose sales 
compensation did not involve scienter when no court or 
regulator had ever held that information material and there 
was no evidence that its disclosure was normal industry 
practice).2 
 
On the other hand, in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), a broker failed to disclose 
that it was making a market in certain securities it strongly 
recommended, and then sold, to plaintiff. Although scienter 
was not directly at issue in Chasins, the court did opine 
that all brokerage firms had followed the same practice and 
had never thought such disclosure was required. Moreover, 
the SEC had never prosecuted any firm for this violation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court and appellees maintain that this circuit already 
follows a Platsis-like rule. In Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortgage 
Trust, 717 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), plaintiffs sued an accounting firm, 
alleging that it fraudulently failed to preparefinancial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Although 
scienter as such was not an issue, we affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint for lack of particularity in pleading fraud under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 9(b). Id. at 100. We do not read Christidis as itself adopting the 
proposition that failure to disclose cannot involve scienter where there is 
no clear duty to do so and the practice at issue is common in the 
industry. It was simply a case involving the pleading standard for 
allegations of fraud. Nevertheless, we think that Platsis is persuasively 
reasoned and we adopt it here. 
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Indeed, as here, the practice at issue in Chasins was later 
addressed by regulation. Id. at 1171 n.5. 
 
Nevertheless, we decline to apply Chasins to this fact 
pattern. First, the holding there did not address scienter. 
See Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 315 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("All that . . . Chasins holds . . . is that 
failure to disclose market-maker status was . . . the 
omission of a material fact. The omission of a material fact, 
without more, does not violate Rule 10b-5. All other 
elements, including scienter, must be proven[.]"). Second, in 
Chasins, appellant's contention that nobody thought 
disclosure was required was demonstrably false, having 
been impeached by appellant's own witness. 438 F.2d at 
1171. That is not the case here. Finally, and most 
importantly, in Chasins the dealer was strongly 
recommending that the customer buy certain securities in 
which the dealer itself was making the market. The dealer 
thus had an undisclosed conflict of interest of major 
proportions; to the extent that the customer followed its 
"advice," the dealer made more money. See Simon v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 885 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (distinguishing Chasins on this basis); Batchelor 
v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 557 (D. Md. 1971) (similar). 
 
We therefore hold that, where defendants are under no 
affirmative legal duty to disclose their order execution 
practices and those practices are widely followed within the 
securities industry, as a matter of law there is no scienter 
when defendants fail to disclose those practices. 
 
B. 
 
In this case, although it appears on the surface that 
appellants have adduced evidence that the nondisclosures 
at issue here were not common industry practice, closer 
examination reveals that contention to be unsupported. 
Appellants first cite the deposition testimony of Paul M. 
Lacy, a retired securities trader, for the proposition that 
"other broker-dealers do not execute customer orders with 
exclusive reference to the NBBO." His testimony supports 
nothing. Mr. Lacy retired before the beginning of the class 
period (November 1992), and therefore cannot offer any 
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competent, firsthand testimony about industry practices as 
they existed at the times material to this litigation. Of even 
greater significance, Lacy did not even testify about the 
practices of other securities dealers in general or even his 
former firm in particular, but testified only about his own 
practices as a trader within that firm. 
 
Appellants also rely on proposed SEC rules on order 
execution as confirmation of Lacy's testimony [A 609]. See 
Order Execution Obligations, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,792 (1995) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Oct. 10, 1995). 
That document recites that traders use "a variety of 
systems and procedures" to satisfy best execution. Id. at 
52,794. If traders use a variety of systems, however, that 
bolsters the district court's conclusion that there was no 
clear duty to supplement the NBBO price and that failure 
to disclose the practice of executing all trades at the NBBO 
price could not have involved scienter. 
 
Appellants likewise refer us to the opinions of a trader 
and a former SEC commissioner who believe that the duty 
of best execution requires affirmative efforts to supplement 
the NBBO with other sources of pricing. See National 
Market System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications & Finance of the Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 103d Cong., Serial No. 103-67, at 355 (1993) 
(statement of securities dealer Bernard L. Madoff that he 
believes it is the obligation of a market maker to achieve 
price improvement whenever possible and does so infifty 
percent of all trades); Declaration of former SEC 
Commissioner Richard Y. Roberts, [A777] ("[i]t would be 
inconsistent with the duty of best execution for a broker- 
dealer to advantage itself by automatically executing 
customer orders at the NBBO when superior prices are 
reasonably available"). This evidence, however, is 
insufficient. 
 
To prevail on summary judgment, one need not show 
that every dealer executes trades at the NBBO price, but 
merely that enough dealers do so that the duty to 
supplement the NBBO price is ambiguous and scienter is 
negated. There is more than ample evidence of that. David 
S. Ruder, a former Chairman of the SEC, member of the 
NASD board and law professor at Northwestern University, 
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stated by affidavit that trades at the NBBO price satisfied 
the duty of best execution and that the general custom and 
practice of firms in the industry was to execute at the 
NBBO price [A225-27]. T. Grant Callery, General Counsel to 
NASD, also stated by affidavit that NASD views the NBBO 
price as satisfying the best execution duty [A 458]. Finally, 
Hugh Quiqley, a trader at Merrill Lynch, declared that he 
had observed the trading practices of every major firm in 
the industry and observed that the standard practice was 
to trade at the NBBO [A 497]. 
 
Finally, while this case was pending on appeal, the SEC 
finalized new regulations pertaining to order execution 
which address directly the practices at issue here. See 
generally Self-Regulatory Organizations; National 
Association of Securities Dealers; Order Granting Partial 
Approval and Notice of Filing and Order Granting 
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 1 to Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to Implementation of the Commission's 
Order Handling Rules, 62 Fed. Reg. 2415 (Jan. 16, 1997). 
Under these new rules, which became effective on January 
20, 1997, market makers must display a customer's limit 
order when the price of that order is superior to the current 
NBBO quote. Moreover, any superior prices quoted on 
electronic communications networks such as SelectNet and 
Instinet must be listed as part of the NBBO price. See SEC 
News Release 97-3, New Trading Rules for NASD and the 
Exchanges, 1997 WL 21042 (Jan. 20, 1997). By these 
regulatory changes, dealers will essentially be required to 
eliminate the practices that appellants complain of in this 
case. We believe, as did the district court, that the fact that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission perceived the 
need to address these order execution practices through the 
regulatory process indicates strongly, if not conclusively, 
that the "duty" to cross orders and to look beyond the 
NBBO for pricing information was ambiguous, indeed 
speculative, during the class period. Regulatory agencies 
would not spend the time, money and effort in 
promulgating regulations if the duty it sought to impose 
were already clear under established law.3  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We do not mean to imply, however, that the duty of best execution is 
in any way unenforceable in a private action under § 10(b) of the 1934 
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 III. 
 
In sum, the evidence in this record is legally insufficient 
for a rational jury to infer that defendants failed to disclose 
their "NBBO-only" execution policy knowing that it was 
fraudulent not to do so, or that they recklessly ignored 
massive evidence suggesting that it was. Accordingly, the 
district court correctly found no scienter and properly 
entered summary judgment for defendants. We will affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Act. Where the duty is clear, or where a practice is obviously fraudulent 
and not pervasive throughout the securities industry, the mere lack of 
regulations directly addressing the practice at issue will not constitute a 
bar to such a suit. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
During the class period, Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 
(hereafter referred to collectively as "Section 10(b)") imposed 
upon the defendants a duty not to deliberately mislead 
their clients. The plaintiffs allege that, when the defendants 
received the plaintiffs' orders, the defendants knew both (1) 
that the plaintiffs expected them to execute these orders at 
a better price than the NBBO if the opportunity to do so 
presented itself, and (2) that the defendants themselves had 
no intention of referencing anything other than the NBBO. 
The issue for decision is whether the plaintiffs have 
produced sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could 
reasonably infer that one or more of the defendants had 
this state of mind when they accepted the plaintiffs' orders 
for execution. I conclude that they have and that summary 
judgment for the defendants is therefore improper. 
 
I. 
 
The class period extends from November 4, 1992 to 
November 4, 1994. The district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants primarily because the SEC, 
during that period, had not explicitly declared that the duty 
of best execution included the duty to consult reasonably 
available sources other than NBBO. Because resolving that 
issue involved considerations within the scope of the SEC's 
expertise, the district court believed it would be 
inappropriate for the courts to recognize a legal duty to 
consult other sources during the class period. Ifind the 
district court's approach unacceptable because it 
mistakenly equates the SEC's lack of guidance with an 
absence of any relevant law. 
 
Our court reaches a somewhat different conclusion. It 
finds that the SEC's post-class period decision effectively 
eliminating the practices of which the plaintiffs here 
complain1 "indicates strongly, if not conclusively, that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The SEC proposed in 1995, and implemented in 1997, amendments to 
the "Quote Rule" which now require market makers to include in the 
NBBO any superior price they are quoting on electronic communications 
networks like SelectNet or Instinet. See Order Execution Obligations, 
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`duty' to . . . look beyond the NBBO for pricing information 
was ambiguous, indeed speculative, during the class 
period." Slip Op. at 11. The court then concludes that there 
was applicable law during the class period and that it was 
established by the way in which a segment of the regulated 
profession behaved during that period. Thus, the 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment, we are told, 
because they have shown "that enough dealers [referenced 
only the NBBO during the class period] so that the duty to 
supplement the NBBO price [was] ambiguous and scienter 
is [therefore] negated." Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
 
I believe that Congress established the principles of law 
applicable here when it enacted Section 10(b) and that 
these principles were not ambiguous during the class 
period. The district court's task was to apply those 
unambiguous principles to the circumstances of each 
transaction between a plaintiff and a defendant. Because 
there are material disputes of fact concerning those 
circumstances, I would reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
II. 
 
The relationship between a client and a broker is that of 
a principal and an agent. Absent special circumstances, it 
is a relationship in which it is understood by all that the 
client-principal seeks his own economic gain and the 
broker-agent earns his commission by helping the client- 
principal achieve that objective. Absent instructions to the 
contrary, the broker is thus expected to maximize the 
economic benefit to the client in each transaction. Hence, 
the duty of best execution. 
 
"[T]he duty of best execution requires a broker-dealer to 
seek the most favorable terms reasonably available under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Exchange Act Release No. 36,310, 60 Fed. Reg. 52972 (Oct. 10, 1995) 
("Proposed Rules"); Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release 
No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48290 (Sept. 12, 1996) ("Final Rules"). Since 
the new NBBO incorporates a far wider range of prices, the possibility of 
executing a trade at an inferior NBBO price when better prices are 
available on an electronic communications network has been eliminated. 
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the circumstances for a customer's transaction." Proposed 
Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. at 52793; U.S. Equity Market Structure 
Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, 57 Fed. Reg. 
32587, 32595 (July 22, 1992); see generally Restatement of 
Agency (2d) § 424 (1958) (stating that agent must "use 
reasonable care to obtain terms which best satisfy the 
manifested purposes of the principal"). That is, the duty of 
best execution requires the defendants to execute the 
plaintiffs' trades at the best reasonably available price.2 
While there may be uncertainty in any particular situation 
as to what prices are reasonably available, the existence of 
a broker-dealer's duty to execute at the best of those prices 
that are reasonably available is well-established. 
 
The set of prices that are reasonably available to a 
broker-dealer is constantly fluctuating. Therefore, 
determining what satisfies the duty of best execution is a 
highly fact-and-circumstance-sensitive inquiry, with the 
scope of the duty evolving over time with changes in 
technology and transformations in the structure offinancial 
markets. See, e.g., Final Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48322-23. 
For example, before the creation of NASDAQ, a broker in an 
over-the-counter market satisfied her duty of best execution 
by contacting at least three market makers prior to 
executing a client's order. See Proposed Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 
at 52793. With the advent of NASDAQ, and the NBBO 
computer system providing instant access to the best bid 
and offer available nationwide, the standard for satisfying 
the duty of best execution necessarily heightened. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other terms in addition to price are also relevant to best execution. In 
determining how to execute a client's order, a broker-dealer should take 
into account order size, trading characteristics of the security, speed of 
execution, clearing costs, and the cost and difficulty of executing an 
order in a particular market. See, e.g., Payment for Order Flow, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33,026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52934, 52937-38 (Oct. 
13, 1993). When the plaintiffs state that better "prices" were reasonably 
available from sources other than the NBBO, I understand that to mean 
that, given an evaluation of price as well as all of the other relevant 
terms, the trade would be better executed through a source of liquidity 
other than the NBBO (e.g. SelectNet, Instinet, in-house limit orders or 
market orders held by the defendants, or limit orders placed by the 
public in the Small Order Execution System). Similarly, for convenience, 
I use the phrase "best reasonably available price" to mean "best terms." 
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The record reflects a genuine dispute of fact as to 
whether prices better than those on the NBBO were 
reasonably available from sources other than the NBBO at 
the time the defendants executed the plaintiffs' trades at 
the NBBO price. There is sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could find, for example, that prices 
better than the NBBO were reasonably available on the 
SelectNet and Instinet at the very moment that the 
defendants chose to execute the plaintiffs' orders at the 
NBBO price. The defendants have suggested that consulting 
other sources besides the NBBO would have added 
substantial expense and delay to the execution of plaintiffs' 
orders, more than offsetting any improvements that might 
have been available in terms of price. See Tr. Oral Arg. at 
28-29. This, however, is clearly a factual dispute, which we 
are not permitted to resolve in favor of the defendants at 
this juncture. 
 
I believe the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable 
trier of fact to conclude that, by the time of the class 
period, both technology and over-the-counter markets had 
developed to a point where it was feasible to maximize the 
economic benefit to the client by taking advantage of better 
prices than the NBBO. 
 
III. 
 
Recovery for federal securities fraud requires a showing 
of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation of a material 
fact. The misrepresentation here, according to plaintiffs, 
was an implied representation made by the defendants 
when they agreed to execute the plaintiffs' orders that they 
would maximize the plaintiffs' economic gain in the 
transaction. Plaintiffs' orders did not specify the price at 
which they were to be executed. It is at least a reasonable 
inference, plaintiffs therefore insist, that they would not 
have placed these orders with the defendants without an 
understanding that the defendants would execute them in 
a manner seeking to maximize plaintiffs' economic benefit. 
Since the defendants knew of the plaintiffs' profit 
motivation, they must have understood that plaintiffs would 
expect them to obtain a price more advantageous to the 
plaintiffs than the NBBO when one was readily available. If, 
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as plaintiffs allege, the defendants intended not to act in a 
manner consistent with this expectation when they 
accepted the orders and yet did not so advise plaintiffs, the 
defendants can be found to have made an implied 
representation that they knew to be false. 
 
In addition to these inferences that can be drawn from an 
economic analysis of the plaintiffs' relationship with the 
defendants, plaintiffs rely upon evidence showing that 
respected members of the brokerage community recognized, 
even prior to the class period, that trades were readily 
available from sources other than the NBBO and that their 
clients expected them to take advantage of those sources 
whenever it would benefit the client. See, e.g., Declaration 
of Paul M. Lacy [A 718]; Declaration of Junius W. Peake [A 
755]; Declaration of Richard Y. Roberts [A 775]. Moreover, 
the plaintiffs have shown that the SEC found clear evidence 
of a two-tiered market during the class period, in which 
NASDAQ market makers routinely traded at one price with 
retail clients like the plaintiffs and at a better price for 
themselves through quotation services like SelectNet and 
Instinet. See Final Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48307-08. They 
have further shown that the possibility that the duty of best 
execution might require resort to sources other than the 
NBBO was being actively debated during the class period 
and that that debate ultimately resulted, after the class 
period, in a regulation effectively requiring as much. Id. 
 
All of this would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find 
that the defendants' misrepresentation--namely, that they 
would execute plaintiffs' trades in a manner maximizing 
plaintiffs' economic gain--was at least reckless, if not 
intentional. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Penn., Inc., 
616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (defining recklessness as 
an extreme departure from ordinary care). Certainly, then, 
scienter can be found on this record. 
 
To be sure, as the court's opinion stresses, the 
defendants have countered with affidavits of other 
respected members of the brokerage community stating 
that their practice during the class period was the same as 
that of the defendants. This evidence could, of course, be 
regarded by a trier of fact as probative of the defendants' 
state of mind when they accepted plaintiffs' orders. But 
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these affidavits do no more than raise a material issue of 
fact as to whether the defendants knew of the expectation 
plaintiffs claim to have had; they do not settle the matter. 
 
At trial, the defendants would certainly be entitled to 
argue to the jury that, because of industry practice, they 
thought their clients would expect them to execute only at 
the NBBO or that they never thought about their clients' 
expectations. Moreover, any evidence, derived from 
knowledge of industry practice or elsewhere, that the 
plaintiffs were generally aware of the defendants' exclusive 
reliance on the NBBO would, of course, be quite probative 
of whether the plaintiffs had the expectations they claim. 
But the court, in elevating the practice of a segment of the 
industry to be outcome determinative, loses sight of the fact 
that the basis for the duty of best execution is the mutual 
understanding that the client is engaging in the trade--and 
retaining the services of the broker as his agent--solely for 
the purpose of maximizing his own economic benefit, and 
that the broker receives her commission because she 
assists the client in reaching that goal. Based on this 
mutual understanding and the absence of any express 
limitations on the brokers' responsibility, a trier of fact 
could find that the defendants understood that they were 
expected to utilize sources other than the NBBO when a 
better price was readily available. 
 
IV. 
 
As I understand the court's analysis, a Section 10(b) 
defendant might be granted summary judgment even if her 
regular practice violated the duty of best execution, and she 
knew or should have known that it violated that duty, so 
long as she can identify a sufficient number of other 
broker-dealers engaged in the same wrongful conduct to be 
able to argue in good faith that the underlying duty was 
"ambiguous." I cannot accept an analysis that will produce 
such a result. 
 
Even a universal industry practice may still be 
fraudulent. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 
1167, 1171-72 (2d Cir. 1970) (non-disclosure of widespread 
industry practice may still be non-disclosure of material 
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fact); Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 
676 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (industry custom may be found 
fraudulent, especially on first occasion it is litigated); see 
also Vermilye & Co. v. Adams Express Co., 88 U.S. 138, 
146 (1874). Indeed, the SEC recently completed an 
investigation in which it found that widespread fraud was 
occurring in the NASDAQ market during a period 
overlapping the class period. See Report Pursuant to 
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market (Aug. 8, 
1996). 
 
As the court emphasizes, the practice of exclusive 
reliance on the NBBO has never been held to be fraudulent 
by any court or regulator. But neither is there any statute, 
rule, regulation, or interpretation, by the SEC or by a court, 
that authoritatively establishes that exclusive reliance on 
the NBBO, even when better prices are reasonably 
available, satisfies the duty of best execution. Whether the 
NBBO exhausted the category of "reasonably available 
prices" during the class period has thus never been 
expressly determined. But this did not absolve the district 
court of the duty to resolve the plaintiffs' securities fraud 
claim once it was presented in this suit. 
 
"In the final analysis, ultimate responsibility for 
construction and enforcement of the securities laws must 
rest with the court." Langert v. Q-1 Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) para. 94,445, at 95,540, 1974 WL 377 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
15, 1974). The district court was not deprived of this 
enforcement authority just because no court or regulator 
had previously chosen to exercise such authority with 
respect to the practice challenged here. See, e.g., Chasins, 
438 F.2d at 1171-72 (finding that defendant's failure to 
disclose its market maker status was material omission 
under Section 10(b), despite fact that SEC had never 
previously held that such disclosure was required). 
 
V. 
 
On the record before us, I believe a reasonable trier of 
fact could conclude that the defendants misrepresented 
that they would execute the plaintiffs' orders so as to 
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maximize the plaintiffs' economic benefit, and that this 
misrepresentation was intentional or reckless because, at 
the time it was made, the defendants knew that they 
intended to execute the plaintiffs' orders at the NBBO price 
even if better prices were reasonably available. A reasonable 
trier of fact could find scienter with respect to a material 
misrepresentation, as well as the other elements essential 
to a Section 10(b) fraud claim. Accordingly, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
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